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ANTONIUS ANDREAL
SCOTISM'S BEST SUPPORTING AUCTOR
Marek GF.NSLLR
I. THE MAKING OF A DOCTOR DULCIFLUUS
ANTONIUS ANDREAE AND HIS POSITION IN
FORMATION OF SCOTISM
The turning of the 13th and 14th century saw the emergence of a bright
new star on the firmament of philosophy - the man who reinvented scho-
lasticism after the Condemnation of 1277: John Duns Scotus. The light of
his thought soon lit up inspiration in many adepts of the Liberal Arts and
the gravity of his doctrine had caught, for some time at least, a number of
young thinkers, who later became most influential philosophers of 14th
century, like Francis de Mayronis, William of Ockham and Peter Auriol,
to name a few. For most of them, however, the contact with the doctrine
of the Subtle Doctor was only an inspiring episode early in their careers
and it would be difficult to call them advocates of scotism, much less
,,true,, scotists. And still, despite the fact that so many of Scotus' best pu-
pils later turned their backs on his teaching, despite Scotus' early death
that had left his work unfinished, the doctrine of John Duns not only sur-
vived but started flourishing and gradually became one of the most vital
and powerful philosophical schools of later middle ages, whose influence
was still felt at the universities even in the 18th century. How was it possi-
ble that the ideas so subtle and so sketchy won minds and hearts of so
many lovers of wisdom?
Propagation of Scotus' views required devout followers, skilful inter-
preters and commentators and, last but not least, good thinkers who, ac-
cepting the opinions of John Duns for their own, would develop them in-
to a comprehensive doctrine covering the whole spectrum of philosophical
inquiry of the time, in a word: transform them into scotism. Such a man
was Antonius Andreae, whom posterity honoured with a telling title
Doctor dulcifluus and an even more unambiguous nickname: Scotellus. It is
only recently, after years of neglect that we discover how rightly were tho-
se names deserved.
The ,Little Scot,,, contrary to his nickname, was born far away from
the North Sea coast and almost thousand miles to the south of the river
Tweed. Native of Aragon, he spent most of his life in Catalonia; we do not
know whether his mother tongue was Spanish or Catalan. His works, ho-
wever, written in Latin, the then lingua franca of the educated people, had
thus become a part of the common heritage of Latin Christendom and we-
re widely read throughout Europe. It is then not merely a funny coinci-
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dcnce that a ^isitor from the East talks to you about the philosopher from
the South, who developed the ideas conceived in the North - this too testi-
fies to the lasting influence of common tradition, in shaping of which
Antonius Andreae also had his share. Let me, therefore, offer these few
comments on his life and philosophical output as a recognition of his con-
tribution to what is the civilisation of us all.
Very little is known about the life of Antonius Andreae. Only a few
fact and dates are certain and so most of the biographical data I am going
to present are only conjectures, drawn from scanty remarks in his own
works and elsewhere. According to most sources, the future Doctor dulci-
fluus was born around 1280 in the little town of Tauste, not far from
Zaragoza, in the kingdom of Aragon.' It is most likely that he joined the
Order of St Francis even before the end of the 13th century, as the canoni-
cal age for putting on the habit was 15. We have no knowledge of his novi-
ciate (beside the fact that it must have lasted a year) but it is very likely
that soon afterwards he had started his education in the provincial
Studium Generale in the city of Lleida. It was a rule that the friars, who
were chose for advanced studies in the studia generalia affiliated at the
most important universities of the time, especially in Paris, spent first two
to three years learning at the studia of their native provinces. Lleida was
by no means a provincial centre of learning; with its new university in the
making it must have given a good opportunity for young Antonius to dis-
play his intellectual talents. The curriculum in Franciscan studia contained
secular subjects, including philosophy of nature and logic; both of them
were later to become the Antonius Andreae's principal interests and it is
possible that his inclination to them had started just then. It is possible too
that his studies there ended with a baccalaureate in Arts.
If the career of Antonius Andreae was similar to that of his future tea-
cher, John Duns Scotus - which is our good guessing, he might continue
his philosophical education already in the centre of the academic life of the
century - in Paris. At the Parisian Studium Generale Franciscans studied
the Liberal Arts for four years: first the trivium (grammar, rhetoric and lo-
gic) and then the quadrivium (arithmetic, geometry, astronomy and mu-
sic); those who had already been bachelors of Arts did not need to take the
full course and could spend only two years at the Faculty.
Sending a young friar to Paris was a serious matter, requiring due consi-
deration of the provincial chapter. Antonius Andreae must have already be-
en an outstanding student, if his superiors had decided to grant him the ho-
nour of studying at Paris. It is probable that the final decision was taken by
the then Father General of Friars Minor - Gonsalvus de Balboa, who used
to be a professor in Paris and was the mentor of John Duns Scotus.' If that
was the case, then Antonius' meeting with Scotus was not a mere coinci-
dence. Although no written testimony corroborates such hypothesis, it can
be accepted in the light of the documents of the order concerning the edu-
1. S. Garcia Navarro has pointed out that all references to Tauste as the place of birth can
be traced back to one source: A. Budinszky, Die Universitat Paris and die Fremden an dar-
selben im Mittelalter, Berlin 1876, p. 207-208. Regrettably, Budinszky does not cite any sour-
ce of his information.
2. Cf. J.Carreras y Artau, -Notas sobre el escotismo medieval en la provincia franciscana
de Aragon-, Antonianum XL (1965), p. 470-471.
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cation of the friars. 'T'hus the first part of Antonius' life, before his meeting
with Scotus, can be systematised as follows: born about 1280, entered novi-
ciate about 1295, studied philosophy in Llcida between 1296 and 1299 and
then in Paris from 1300 to 1304, assuming that he took the full course of
Arts there, or till 1302, if he had already had the baccalaureate.
1304 is another documented date in the biography of Antonius An-
dreae. According to Charles Lohr, from 1304 to 1307 Antonius Andreae
was a '<master in Paris».3 Of course, it is impossible that he had already be-
en a master of theology at that time; it follows then that he must have been
a master of studies at the Franciscan studiurn there, teaching philosophy to
his younger fellow-friars. It is difficult to say whether he had already em-
braced the teaching of Scotus then; still, such possibility is not excluded,
for he might have had contact with Scotus during the latter's short stay in
Paris form 1302 to 1303. There are two more reasons why 1304 is an im-
portant date in Antonius' career. First of all, it was the year of Scotus' final
return to Paris. Soon after his arrival Scotus received doctor's degree in
theology, followed by the title of the Regent Master, which he held from
1306 to 1307, when he was summoned to take the position of Lector prin-
cipalis at the Franciscan Studium generate in Cologne. There is no doubt
that Antonius Andreae attended his lectures, especially that - and this is
the second point - he must have started studying theology around that da-
te or before it.
The course of theological studies at Paris required six years: four years
for the baccalaureate and two more for master's degree. Even if we assume
that Antonius Andreae had started studying theology in 1303 and went
through the course without any interruptions, he would have finished it in
1309. However, the last date attesting to his stay in Paris is 1307; further-
more, we do not find him on the manuscript list of Parisian masters who
disputed de qoulibet before 13 14 (it was not obligatory for masters of the-
ology but most of them did it; moreover, around 13 12 we find him already
back in Catalonia teaching philosophy of nature these two facts suggest
that his academic career in Paris was broken before he managed to com-
plete his theological studies.
It is still disputed whether he had written his commentary on the
Sentences; it is highly probable that he had at least started it. What may be
a proof is a tiny opusculum called Compendiosum Principium in IV libros
Sententiarum, formerly attributed to St. Bonaventure, which might have
formed the preface to that commentary.' The weakness of the proof is that
the work has not survived in any manuscript copy and, therefore, is diffi-
cult date. It might as well be the preface to Antonius' later work Abbre-
viatio Opens oxoniensis Scoti. Putting all the facts together it may be con-
cluded that Antonius education at Paris was cut short most probably by
the very sank reasons that drove Duns Scotus to Cologne: they were both
collateral victims in the struggle between the French king Philip the Fair
3. Cf. Ch.I,ohr, , Medieval Latin Aristotle Commentaries ,,, Traditio 1967, p. 365.
4. Cf. 1.Vizqucz Janeiro, Ruins e hitos del escotisrno primitivo en Espana, Acta V
Congresses Scotistici Internationalis , Salamanticae 1981, Ronia 1984, p . 432-436.
5. Cf. M. Gensler Catalogue of the works br or ascribed to Antonius Andreae, w:
ltediacvalia Pbilosophica Polonurusn XXXI (1992 ), str 152-153.
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and pope Boniface VIII. When staying in Paris could no longer be r. con-
ciled with the loyalty to the pope, they had to leave.
Scotus was ordered to go to Cologne, where he died a year later; An-
tonius Andreae returned to his motherland. By 1312 he had been settled in
Catalonia, presumably in the convent of Monzd, the place where he
spent most of the rest of his life. The first part of his stay there must have
been extremely busy, for it is then that he had composed his most impor-
tant works: commentaries on the Metaphysics and the Ars Vetus, a collec-
tion of early medieval translations and commentaries on Aristotle's logical
opuscula, and the Quaestiones ordinariac de tribus principiis naturac. Our
knowledge of that is based on a chain of reasoning deduced from two
sources. Vazquez Janeiro has discovered a reference to Antonius' logical
work: either the quaestiones ordinariae or the commentary on the Ars
Vetus in a manuscript dated 1312. On the other hand, in the commentary
itself we find references to Antonius' earlier works, namely the conunen-
tarv on the Metaphysics and quaestiones ordinariac in logic and philo-
sophy of nature.' The Metaphysics commentary, in turn, contains onk re-
ferences to the questions on natural philosophy, which are beyond any
doubt identical with Dc tribus principiis naturac. Thus we are able to re-
construct the sequence of Antonius Andreae's earlier works as follov^s: De
tribus principiis naturae, Metaphysics commentary, Quaestiones ordinariae
de logica, Ars Vetus commentary. I shall comment on them in due order.
The earliest of the group, Quaestiones ordinariae de tribus prircipiis
naturae, is also Antonius' most original work. Its author must have found
it valuable, or at least useful, for there is evidence that he had revised it,
probably preparing another course in natural philosophy, by adding two
more questions to it. The colophon in the Erfurt manuscript of Dc trebus
principiis says: «Istae quaestiones sunt in universo undecimae, quay (rater
Antonius Andreae determinavit anno quo legit naturalia in Montehono
(i.e. Monzd)».s Now the funny thing is that the manuscript contains 13
questions. The discrepancy can be explained when looking at the stricture
of the work. Eleven is the number of questions concerning the three prin-
ciples; the initial question is devoted to the subject matter of physic, and
the final one - to the composite. There are other traits: the initial questions
functions also separately under the title Quaestio de subiecto totiu^ ^cien-
tiae naturalis;9 the final one is always attached to the rest of the wort: but
it is markedly different, since it is the only of them where we find re ,ren-
ces to Peter Auriol. According to Anneliese Meier Peter had lectured on
the principles of nature in Bologna in 1312,10 so Antonius' question , -n the
composite must be later. Of course, it is difficult to say whether or not the
6. Cf. 1. Vazquez Janeiro, Op. cit., p. 434.
7. Antonius Andreae, Scriptum super librum Praedicamentorum Aristotelis, Veneti ^ 1480,
f. 24va: «1)e ista materia do magis et minus in formes plura me recolo dixisse in duabuo quacs-
tionibus ordinaries'., Scriptur super librum Isagogen Porphyrii, Venetiis 1480, f. 7rb: Unde
super 4 Metaphysicae recolo me aliqualiter illam quaestionem pertractasse'.
8. MS Erfurt, Amplon. F 359.
9. Cf. M.Gensler, Op. cit., p. 151.
10. Cf. A.Maier, Literarhtstorische Notizen fiber Petrus Aureole, Durandus uud den
Cancellarius.', Gregorianum XXI (1948), p. 218-19.
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two ucstions were added at the same time, still this does not change the
fact that the work had been revised.
The next work is the commentary on the Metaphysics, Antonius' lon-
gest tnd probably most influential piece. Ironically, it has survived in ex-
tensu probably in one or two manuscripts only. Already in the 14th cen-
tury, probably still in Antonius' lifetime, it was divided into two: the
expo,,ilo litteralis and the yuaestiones. The latter had become immensely
popular: today there are over 40 manuscripts of it scattered around Eu-
ropc; e former has not survived separately in any manuscripts but there
are e^ printed editions of it. The structure of the work is quite complex:
quesr 's of various length are embedded in the commentary ad litteram,
they supposed to discuss and explain certain problems arising from the
anal of Aristotle's text. The commentary is preceded by a long preface
and . ntroductory question concerning the subject-matter of metaphy-
sics. c whole work is started with a quotation from the Ecclesiastes:
«Gvr n coeli circuivi Bola...,,.'' Antonius must have found that structure
very !table for the purpose of presenting his views, for he repeats it in
his c rnentaries to Ars Vetus; the quotation is repeated too. Incidentally
it wa .cd also in Compendiosum principium in libros Sententiarum. His
fond s for such a structure makes it possible that the question on the
subj, matter of natural philosophy was added to Dc tribus principiis
full( ig the example set by the Metaphysics commentary. In a way, An-
toni was completing what had been started by Scotus: the latter had
writ on the subject-matter of theology, the former composed similar
stud or the remaining theoretical sciences.
7 nfluence of Duns Scotus on Antonius Andreae's commentary on
the : iphystcs should not be seen as an inspiration only. Antonius clearly
mod A his questions on the ones written by Scotus. Bdrubd has shown
that ov - but not all - of Scotus' questions were simply reworked and
extcn.ied by Antonius; the material for those questions of Antonius'
which do not have direct counterpart in Scotus' work is taken mostly
from ' s Ordinatio.12 Needless to say, there is no doubt that Antonius is
the a or of the commentary, choosing which subject requires special tre-
atme which should only be signalled and which can be dropped altoget-
her. ;ide giving account of the polemics fought by the Subtle Doctor,
Ante s indulges in his own ones, repeatedly taking aim at Peter Auriol,
prob., his only contemporary he finds worthy of mentioning by name.
By til, vay, this is also true about the De tribus principiis, and even more
so, a, structure is absolutely original.
T' cstimony given by the commentary on the Ars Vetus points out to
one r r earlier work of Antonius: the Quaestiones ordinariae de logica. The
work ^.s long been believed to have been lost. It is possible, however, that it
is not st forever. It may be identical with the Tractutus de modis distinetio-
num rich is preserved in two manuscript copies in Assisi and Padua.13
I M. Gensler, Op. cit., p. 149-150.
I ' C.Bcrubc, Antoine Andre, temoin et intcrprete de .Scot, Antonianurn LIV (1979),
p. 41
1
. O. Wcijers, Le travail intellcctuel a la Faculte des arts de Paris: Testes et maitres
(ca. 1 1500), s. 1, Turnhout 1994, p. 67 and C. Cenci, Bihliotbeca Manuscripta ad Sacrum
Con; rl lssisirnscm, Assisi 1981, p. 492.
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Since Dc tribus principiis naturac was also frequently called a «tractatus,, and
the two works have strikingly similar incipits, it is likely that they also have
the same author. I have not seen either of the manuscripts yet and therefore I
am not able to say anything more precise about it.
Thus we have come to the work which is our main source of informa-
tion about Antonius Andreae's philosophical output: it is the frequently
mentioned above, well known logical work - the commentary on the Ars
Vetus. It is composed of five separate commentaries to Aristotle's Cate-
gories and Hermeneutics, Porphyrius's Isagoge, Bocthius's Divisiones and
the Liber sex principiorum ascribed to Gilbert de la Porrce, preceded by a
general preface and an introductory question, naturally devoted to the
subject-matter of logic.' Following the pattern of his Metaphysics com-
mentary Antonius gives both literal explanation of the texts discussed and
addresses some detailed problems in questions. At the same time, he fo-
llows vet another pattern: finishing up what Scotus has begun. As it was
the case before, Antonius had the model in three sets of Scotus' quaestio-
nes to the works of Aristotle and Porphyrius. He had reworked their ma-
terial, added a corresponding literal commentary and written - ad mentem
Scoti - two more works on the remaining parts of the Ars Vetus.
The commentary's importance for a historian lies in the fact that it con-
tains references to so many earlier works of Antonius Andreae. This, in
turn, is caused by Antonius' attitude to his works. It is almost certain that
he had written them all for didactic purposes - this is attested by informa-
tion contained in some colophons to the manuscripts of his works, it is al-
so certain that he treated his works as the means of spreading the doctrine
of the Subtle Doctor - he admits that himself in a note that shows a rare
example of philosophical modesty: -Reader, please pay attention to what
you read, because whatever is beneficial in the questions above comes
from the doctrine of Scotus, whose steps I followed as closely as I could,,
(Attende igitur lector qui legis, quod siquid benedictum est in quaestioni-
bus supradictis ab arte doctrinae Scoticae processit, cuius vestigia quantum
potui et quantum ipsum capio sum secutus).'' With those two ends in
mind Antonius had to return to some problems again and again. Natu-
rally, they were the most controversial problems. The controversy could
be of twofold character: it referred either to the problems Scotus did solve
himself in a way that was contrary to the communis opinio doctorum, like
the problem of the univocal concept of being, or to the contemporary phi-
losophical problems which were not directly addressed or clearly solved
by Scotus, like - for instance - the question whether a form, particularly a
substantial form, can accept more or less. In the works mentioned above
Antonius does not merely repeat the solution he had given to the pro-
blems before but tries to discuss the issue from another angle, informing
the reader at the same time that he had already addressed them in detail el-
sewhere.
The last work belonging to the group of what I have called earlier
works of Antonius Andreae is the small opusculum known under the na-
14. CI. 1lauck Gensler, Op. cit., p. 147-149.
15. Antonius Andreae, Quaestioncs de tribus principns rerum naturalium , Venetiis 1489,
f. 26vb.
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me Quaestio dc subiccto totius logicae." The question is preceded by a
short preface in which Antonius says that having completed the commen-
taries on the Ars Vetus he is going to comment on the remaining books of
the Oreanum, i.e. the so-called Ars Nova. Since the following question
discusses the problem whether syllogism is the proper subject of logic, it is
clear that it was meant to open a commentary on the Analytics. To the best
of our knowledge Antonius did not finish that commentary. It is difficult
to explain why he did not. Certainly, it was not broken short by his death,
for the introductory part seems to have been written almost immediately
after the completion of the earlier work, which - if we are to trust the
scant information concerning its dating - was written around 1312, some
twenty odd years before Antonius' death. It follows then that he either did
not want to complete it or the situation did not permit him to do so. The
most likely answer is that something must have happened in his career
which rendered his planned commentary redundant.
It may have been moving quarters. Some manuscripts of his works
contain remarks that he taught in Lleida. We have no information when he
moved there or whether or not he stayed there for the rest of his life, inde-
ed even the order of places in which he lived (Monzo and Lleida) is not
quite certain. What we know is that he was there teaching natural philo-
sophy, maybe reading the revised version of his De tribus principiis.
Possibly it is also there that he had renewed his interest in theology.
Unfortunately, none of the remaining works attributed to Antonius
Andreae carries any information which could help a historian in determi-
ning later course of his career; to be true, even the authorship of those
works is far from certain.
The group of works ascribed to Antonius Andreae, whose attribution
is more or less questionable consists of four different pieces. Firstly, there
are two theological works: Abbreviatio Opens oxoniensis Scoti and several
collections of sermons; for both there are good arguments to accept them
as authentic. The other group contains two philosophical works: two sets
of questions on Aristotle's De anima and Physics, respectively.
The collections of sermons are preserved in three manuscripts in Assisi.
Three of them are found in two manuscripts. In one they are attributed to
fratcr Antonius de Hispania in the other - to Antonius de Ylcrdia (Lleida);
Marti identifies the author with Antonius Andreae, arguing that he was
the only Franciscan friar of that name in the custody of Lleida living at
that time." The fourth collection is anonymous, yet its title, Scrmones de
mortuis, and the incipit are identical with the ones mentioned by Wadding
as the works of Antonius Andreae. As I have not seen the questions I can-
not offer any comment concerning those attributions. Definitely, it would
be interesting to see if they contain any Scotistic traits.
Unlike the sermons, which have remained in obscurity until our times,
the Abbreviatio Operis Oxoniensis Scoti is a work of certain reputation.
With nine manuscript copies preserved and four printed editions, the most
16. Cf. M. Gensler, Op. cit., p. 151, 153.
17. Cf. P. Marti dc Barcelona , A`r. Antoni Andreu, O.M., doctor dulcifluus,,, Criterion
1929, p. 345. The collections of sermons he refers to are contained in MSS Assisi, B. Con.
532, 540,683.
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recent bring 1628, it is the third most popular work of intonius Andreae
(after the Metaphysics questions and De tribus principiis naturae)." Still, of
the nine manuscripts only one bears the name of Antonius, six call the aut-
hor Scotulus, and the remaining two attribute the authorship to other peo-
ple. Of course, Scotulus almost certainly refers to Antonius Andreae, who
shared that nickname with another Franciscan, Pettus de Aquila, vet the
absence of the full name is a little puzzling. A closer look at the Abbre-
viatio gives some more evidence for the authorship of Antonius - in seve-
ral places in the work one can find remarks like: ,Haec est solutio addita
Antonii Andreac»;'`' undoubtedly they are incorporated marginal com-
ments showing scotistic erudition of the scribe and at the same time testif-
ying to the true authorship of the work. Another important trait are the
references to and polemics with Peter Auriol, Antonius' favourite polemi-
cist. Again, as in other works of Antonius, he is almost the only 14th cen-
tury philosopher mentioned explicitly throughout the whole work.
Finally, there is a long tradition accepting the authorship of Antonius,
even though doubt was as much persistent. Sbaraglia, who gives an ac-
count of various opinions concerning it (himself remaining sceptical)
claims that it must have been written it after 0,2 0 which makes Anto-
nius' authorship at least possible, since it is assumed from a remark in the
explicit of a Pamplona manuscript of his works that he died in 1333 or
shortly before it.''
What is interesting about Abbreviatio Operis oxoniensis is the reasons
of its popularity. After all, it is a work which in its very title is not promi-
sing anything one would not find elsewhere, i.e. in Scotus himself. On the
other hand, one could well ask the same question about the earlier works
of Antonius - I believe the answer would be similar. Antonius clearly wri-
tes his works for students and this is almost manifest in Abbreviatio.
Contrary to the title he does not only summarise Scotus; he clears the
matters up eliminating redundant and parallel arguments but also com-
menting on the solutions and giving lengthy explanations of the problems
lie himself finds difficult or interesting, all the time trying to svstematise
the terminology. At the same time, he is at the watch over the purity of the
doctrine of the Subtle Doctor. He sees to it that the reader were informed
which of the opinions presented are Scotus' on and which are not.
Moreover, the views which do not meet the standards of doctrinal ortho-
doxy are duly argued against. Finally, the work seems to bear yet another
characteristics of Antonius: it is possible to notice certain preference for
the philosophical - the problems which refer to metaphysics or natural
philosophy receive markedly more attention than the strictly theological
ones.
Those very characteristics were probably the reasons for attributing to
Antonius the authorship of two other works: Quaestiones in libros de ani-
ma and Quaestiones in libros Physicorum. The first of the two is relatively
18. Cf. M. Gensler, Op. cit., p. 152-153.
19. Antonius Andreae, In IV libros Sententiarum opus, Venetiis 1578, f. 56ra.
20. Cf. G. Sbaralca, Supplementum ad `Soriptores trium ordinum S. Francisci, Roma 1806,
p. 69ab.
21. Cf. A.d'Ors, Utrum nomen signif)cet rem vel passionem in anima, ,Archives d'histoi-
re doctrinalc et littcraire du moven age ", 62 (1995), p. 9.
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well known. It survived in 15 manuscript copies and Wadding edited it as
a work of Scotus in the third volume of his Opera omnia. Lohr claims that
Quaestiones in libros de anima might have actually been started by Duns
Scotus himself and Antonius could have completed 1t.2 ' Berube suggests
that the final form of the work can be ascribed to Jacobus de Turbio.23 In
any case, even if Antonius had any role in the completion of De anima
questions, it was the role of an editor, at best, and therefore being unable
to discern the contributions of each of the philosophers within the text we
are not able to say much of Antonius Andreae's interpretation of Scotus'
theory of intellect.
The Quaestiones in libros Physicorurn is a work shrouded in mystery.
Existing in a single, eat-IN, 15th century English manuscript in Cambridge it
is not even directly ascribed to Antonius Andreae. Only the table of con-
tents of the codex (which also contains Antonius' Metaphysics questions),
prepared after binding it, most probably at the same time it was written or
somewhat later, mentions the name of Antonius as the author of both
works. A closer analysis of the Quaestiones shows that it is indeed a work
belonging to the scotist school. Moreover, at least some parts of it bear
striking resemblance to Antonius' De tribus principiis naturae, several
questions being clearly modelled on it." Furthermore, it contains some
discussions with Peter Auriol, Antonius favourite polemicist. Still, doubts
remain. Antonius Andreae habitually referred to his earlier works when
discussing matters he had been dealing with before. I Icre, there arc no
such references and his name is conspicuously absent. This is puzzling, if
we bear in mind that some passages of the Quacstiones are rewritten form
De tribus principiis almost word for word. The argument that Abbreviatio
Operis oxoniensis contains no references of that sort either cannot be ac-
cepted, since Abbreviatio has a totally different character. Therefore it may
be concluded that Quaestiones in libros Physicorurn is a work of a later
scotist, possibly an Englishman, who had very good knowledge of both
Scotus and Antonius Andreae, whose views he accepted as his own.
As it has been already said, even the mistaken attribution tells us so-
mething about what the contemporaries and posterity thought of Anto-
nius Andreae. First of all, he was associated with the true teaching of John
Duns Scotus. It can be said that Antonius succeeded in persuading the phi-
losophical public that his work was nothing but a continuation of what
the Subtle Doctor had started. That continuation was meant to proceed in
a double way: on one hand Antonius' works were supposed to popularise
the teaching of Scotus in those issues Scotus had already discussed himself
by presenting a clearer but still comprehensive and trustworthy exposition
of his doctrine - that was what Antonius did in the Metaphysics commen-
tary and especially in the Abbreviatio Operis oxoniensis; on the other hand
Antonius tried to extend the doctrine of Scotus onto the disciplines his
master had not managed to put under scrutiny - here Antonius introduced
22. Cf. Ch. Lohr, Op. cit, p. 365.
23. Cf. C. Bcrubc, <Critique do I'Avicennisme Augustinisant<<, in: Acta IV Congressus
Scotistici Internationalis, Oxoniae 1960, Ronia 1968 , V. 1, p. 212.
24. Cf. M. Gensler, Two quaestiones concerning the subject-matter of'physics, paper pre-
sented at the S.i.E.P.M. Conference ,Aristotle in Britain in the Middle Ages,,, Cambridge
1994.
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Scotism into the philosophy of nature with his Dc tribes principiis natu-
rae, extended it in the study of logic with his commentaries on the Ars
Vetus, and probably in moral philosophy - with his sermons. The ways
were complementary to one another and - as we have seen - Antonius to-
ok great pains to move ahead without losing contact with Scotus, his doc-
trine and concepts he tried to explain and use in a systematic way.
In both ways Antonius Andreae achieved a success. Despite the fact
that he wrote almost all of his works in a place which was situated far
away from the centres of learning of his times many of his works became -
toutes proportions gardecs - philosophical best-sellers of the 14th and, es-
peciall, 15th century Latin Europe, penetrating to the remotest outposts
of Western civilisation. Part of the success can be, of course, attributed to
the circumstances: it was the time when the dominance of philosophical
schools was being established and Antonius Andreae was instrumental in
doing that for scotism; moreover, his religious order - the Franciscans -
was one of the most operative intellectual corporations of the time and the
teaching which won approval of the chapter was quickly spread through
the network of Franciscan Studia Generalia. Here I could offer a digres-
sion concerning Poland: because both Polish province of the Franciscans
and the provincial stadium were set up relatively late - only in the second
part of the 15th century - scotism had not arrived in Poland until more or
less that time. But when it did arrive it was taught from the manuals by
Antonius Andreae.''
One could remark here, however, that Antonius later demise was roo-
ted in his success. The more closely he followed the teaching of the Subtle
Doctor the more likely was the posterity to take his works for Scotus'
own, first accepting them as valuable doctrine, later rejecting it as a work
of a ,dunce>>. Antonius popularity, judged by the number of printed edi-
tions of his works, reached its peak around the turning of the 15th and
16th century. The decline of scholastics, receding under the pressure of
humanism from one side and Reformation from the other, was gradually
eroding interest in Antonius Andreae's works. In the fifty years, 1475-
1525, there were over forty editions of his various writings, the remaining
three quarters of the 16th century bring only four editions and in all four
cases it is the Abbreviatio Opens oxoniensis. Antonius remains interesting
only as a commentator of Scotus. Even the return of scholasticism started
with the counter-reformation does not revert the trend: the monumental
edition of Scotus' Opera omnia published by Wadding in 1639 sporadi-
cally mentions the name of Antonius and his Expositio litteralis in Meta-
physicam (part of the Metaphysics commentary) is published there under
the name of Scotus. Finally, Enlightenment draws the curtain of neglect
over the then Doctor dulcifluus for more than a hundred years.
Antonius Andreae was not forgotten entirely. In 19th century his name
appears in the works of authors writing about the history of the Fran-
ciscans, like Sbaraglia, or about Catholic theology, like Hurter. However,
it is only in the end of the century that we can see the beginning of re-
search concerning the teaching of Scotus and scotism in general, following
25. Cf. E. Jung-Palczewska , M. Gensler, , Szkotyzm w Polsce», to appear in Acta
Universitatis Lodzensis 1996, p. 3-7.
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the vvaye of interest in scholasticism, originated by pope Leo XIII with his
famous dictum: ,Ite ad Thomam!». The research in scotism gained mo-
mentum with the establishment of the Scotistic Commission in Quaracchi
in 1927. Its first director, father Longprc, was also the author of several
papers concerning Antonius Andreae; still the interest in Antonius was
only secondary. The most important date for the modern study of Anto-
nius is 1929. It was the year when Marti de Barcelona published the paper
F: Antoni Andreu O.M., doctor dulciflous, which was the first monograph
of Antonius Andreae. His research was carried on, both in Spain - by
brothers Carreras y Artau and later by Vazquez Janeiro - and abroad, par-
ticularly by Bcrubc. It was him, who finally recognised the importance of
Antonius Andreae for the formation of scotism as a philosophical school,
calling him -the second founder of scotism». In the light of this the papers
I ant presenting here are nothing but a set of examples to that comment.
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2. ANTONIUS ANDREAFI'S
DE TRIBUS PRINCIPIIS NATURAF
THE SPANISH HANDBOOK OF SCOTISM
When John Duns Scotus, Master of Studies at the Franciscan Studium
Generale was dying in Cologne on 8 November 1308 his name had alre-
ady been known throughout Europe, not only within his own order,
which was soon to accept his teaching as its approved, though unofficial,
doctrine (alongside the teaching of Alexander of Hales and St. Bonaven-
ture) but also outside it, at the growing number of universities, where the
works of the Subtle Doctor were read and discussed, both critically and
apologetically. Duns Scotus was becoming rapidly popular and his ideas
were winning a following comparable to that of the great figures of 13th
century philosophy and theology: Thomas Aquinas and Albert the Great.'
There was, however, a marked difference between the heritage of those
two thinkers and that of Duns Scotus: they left behind imposing number
of works their followers could always consult when searching for a parti-
cular solution, whereas Scotus's premature death left his followers with
but a sketch of a doctrine, drawn first of all in his Sentences commentary,
but also in his earlier works, like the questions on Metaphysics and Cate-
gories and treated in a more detailed and systematic way only in the few
later ones: Quodlibets, De prima principio and Theoremata. Had he lived
longer, he would have undoubtedly tried to address more problems belon-
ging to various disciplines of philosophy. His early demise left his disciples
with a daunting task of bringing in the Scotist spirit where their master
had failed to enter.
One of the disciplines John Duns Scotus had never specifically discus-
sed was philosophy of nature. As it is one of the fundamental parts of phi-
losophv, it could not remain neglected if Scotism were to become a com-
prehensive philosophical view on a par with the existing ones. The ,empty
spaces,, had to be filled in somehow. The task was not impossible: some of
the existing works of Scotus contained passages referring to physical pro-
blems in a more or less general way, some issues were discussed on the si-
de of theological or metaphysical disputes, still other passages could yield
,,physical,, conclusions after a more detailed analysis. The first man who
set to the work of putting together the scattered theses and presenting
them in a coherent way was Scotus's own pupil, Antonius Andreae. His
aim was to give a systematic presentation of the philosophy of nature ac-
cording to the intention of Scotus (ad mentem Scoti) and referring to his
own words as often as possible. He decided to organise the material in the
1. Cl. C. Pini, ,Scotistic Aristotelianism: Antonius Andreae's Lxpositio and Quaestiones
on the Metaphysics»,in:Atti del Congresso Scotistico Internazionale Roma 1993, Roma 1995,
p. 375-376.
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popular form of questions, which he presented publicly as quaestiones or-
dinariae at least once, when teaching natural philosophy at the Franciscan
convent in Monzo; there is some evidence that he may have read them
again in Lleida,2 where he probably supplemented the work with two mo-
re questions to serve as introduction and epilogue to the whole. It is al-
most certain that those questions formed the body of his well-known
work, Dc tribus principiis naturae.
The title of the work, in full: De tribus principiis rerum natur-alium:
materia forma et privatio, is not very original; on the contrary, it seems to
be modelled on the title of a work by St. Thomas Aquinas, Dc principiis
naturae, written some 60 years earlier. The subject itself was quite popu-
lar: at the same time Antonius Andreae was reading his questions at Mon-
za his fellow-Franciscan and possibly also a university colleague from
Paris, Peter Auriol, was discussing the same subject in Bologna`. Antonius
was clearly not going to set a new pattern of presenting the doctrine con-
cerning natural beings but to fill an existing form with the Scotist content.
Accordingly, he decided to include in his work all the topics which were
raised by Scotus in the more -physical- questions of his Quaestiones sub-
tilissirnae in Metaphysicam and Ordinatio - of the total number of II
questions of the main part of De tribus principiis naturae, five have titles
modelled after questions from Scotus' Metaphysics and two - after ques-
tions from Ordinatio. The remaining ones are products of his own inven-
tion but they too contain material coming from the two works of Scotus.
The choice of the form might have been caused by the requirements of the
curriculum, which demanded a standard lecture course in natural philo-
sophy, presented in the form of quaestiones ordinariae, questions in a par-
ticular subject, for instance on the three principles of nature: Dc tribus
principiis naturac. Assuming that Antonius' Dc tribus principiis is identical
with his quaestiones ordinariae in natural philosophy, it is the first survi-
ving textbook of Scotist philosophy of nature intentionally written for
that purpose.
Despite the title, his work is divided into five parts, the middle three
being devoted to the principles in question. Most of the work, i.e. ten
questions out of the total number of 13 is devoted to the problems concer-
ning matter and form, each being discussed in five respective questions. Of
the remaining three questions, one - immediately following the first two
parts - deals with privation, the third announced principle; it is followed in
turn by the final question, which, in a sense, brings together all the main
issues analysed in De tribus principiis naturae taking up the subject of the
composite as the end of the process of generation. The third -loose,, ques-
tion precedes the whole body of the work and serves as an introduction of
sorts, discussing the problem of the subject-matter of natural philosophy.
Altogether, the work forms a wonderfully consistent unity, its structure
showing signs of careful planning and its content being presented in a cle-
ar, almost elegant way. The exquisite form of the work is a strong argu-
2. Cf. A. d'()rs, ,Utruni nomen significet rem vel passionem in anima,,, Archives d'his-
toire doctrinalc ct littcraire du moven age , 62 (1995), p. 9.
3. Cf. A.Maicr, « Litcrarhistorischc N otizen Ober Pctrus Aureoli , Durandus and den
.. C.utccllariuss' , Gregori.airmr XXI (1948 ), p. 218-19.
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meat in support of the opinion that De tribus principiis as we know it is a
work which must have been written in full by the author himself. This
supposition is strengthened by the fact that there are some other works by
Antonius, e.g. his Aristotle commentaries, that are known to be scripta, i.e.
works written by the author himself (to be distinguished from reportatio-
nes, i.e. students' notes from lectures and disputes or ordinationes, i.e. no-
tes edited by the author). Such a form could suggest that he had found his
questions important. We know at least that he himself found Dc tribus
principiis important enough to refer to it several times in many of his other
works,4 where he sometimes only summarises the determination he had
given to the problem before. Giving his text a definitive and clear forth,
more suitable and hence more attractive for the reader, Antonius no doubt
helped spread the Scotist "physical,, ideas it contained much better, quic-
ker and farther than any other disciple of the Subtle Doctor.
The scope of the influence of De tribus principiis is in a way reflected
by the fact that its copies are almost ubiquitous. The 16 manuscripts of
Antonius' manual which have survived to our times are almost evenly dis-
tributed among the old libraries of Europe: from Spain to Poland and
from Italy to Scotland.' What is more, the text of the work was rewritten
not merely for didactic purposes at Franciscan studia; it was also treated as
an interesting presentation of Scotist philosophy of nature and depending
on the reader's attitude to the doctrine of the Subtle Doctor it provided
either arguments of authority or arguments for polemics. I shall try to
show here instances of both attitudes. First, however, let me give you an
insight into the work, the problems it discusses and the way it presents
and interprets the teaching of Scotus.
The first problem Antonius Andreae takes on in De tribus principiis is,
appropriately, the problem of the subject matter of physics, i.e. natural
philosophy. The title of the initial question asks: "Utrum mobilitas sit for-
malis ratio subiectiva primi subiecti philososophiae naturalis», i.e. whether
mobility is the formal characteristic of the first subject of natural philo-
sophy. Before presenting his conclusions concerning the problem
Antonius first discusses the problem of mobility and motion itself and
then the necessary characteristics of the first subject of a science. Those in-
troductory discussions serve to explain the title of the question.
In the first place, Antonius presents a twofold division of the concept
of mobility. According to him it can be viewed either as an ability or as an
actual reality. The former aspect shows mobility merely as a potential for
change. As such mobility is formally a relation (respectus) of its object to a
certain end. That means that though mobility is formally and essentially
different from its subject, i.e. a physical object, it remains really identical
with it, i.e. not a different thing. It is in this aspect that mobility is the pro-
per attribute of the first subject of natural philosophy, i.e. the quality
which serves as a criterion for accepting anything as an object of physics.
Antonius explains his statement in the following way: If we accept mobi-
lity as the proper attribute of the first subject of physics, then whatever is
4. Cl. M. Gensler, ,The making of a Doctor Dulcifluus,,, n. 7.
5. Cf. M. Gensler Catalogue of- the works by or ascribed to Antonius Andreae, w:
Mediaevalia Philosophica Polomrrurn XXXI (1992), str 150.
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included in the consideration of the science must be either moved or, at le-
ast, apt to be moved; this being true immobilia are not within the scope of
interests of natural philosophy, which is really the case. The latter aspect
refers to mobility as actual motion. For Antonius the concept of motion
can be characterised as follows. First of all, motion is formally neither a re-
lative nor an absolute, since motion towards a substance, quality, or quan-
tity is an absolute but motion towards a place is relative. Secondly, motion
is separable from its object, which can also be considered in rest; thus it is
different from the object both really and formally. For those reasons mo-
tion cannot be the proper attribute of the subject of natural philosophy."
The other part of the introductory section is concerned with characte-
ristics of the first subject of a science (not specifically physics). Antonius
sets several conditions which must be met by such a subject. In the first
place, it must possess a quidditative concept, which would not be included
in anything earlier referring to that science, otherwise it would be neither
subject nor first. Furthermore, the quidditative concept must belong to the
first subject formally and absolutely, because cognition refers to the form
and because the relative presupposes the absolute. Finally, the fist subject
must be adequate to its science, because everything in a science has attri-
bution to its first subject in one way or another.'
The corpus of the initial question contains discussion of a list of propo-
sitions divided into negative and affirmative ones. In the first part An-
tonius refutes the opinions of other philosophers, the second part presents
his own, Scotist opinion. He starts with disproving the Thomist opinion
that being (ens) in whatever consideration can be the subject of natural
philosophy, because otherwise physics would be subordinate to metaphy-
sics, as they would share the same subject. The second refuted opinion is
that of Aristotle: Antonius states that the claim that body (corpus) is the
subject of physics is false, since the science, whose principal interest is in
mobile objects, refers to incorporeal mobile objects, e.g. angels, too. The
third proposition to be disproved claims that mobility is the formal, sub-
jective characteristic of the first subject of natural philosophy. Antonius
rejects it argumenting that as a relative mobility cannot be formal charac-
teristic of the subject of physics, since it cannot give the science the unity,
which can be drawn only from something absolute. Moreover, being a
proper attribute of the first subject of physics mobility cannot be its for
mal characteristics, since the latter is prior to the former. The final solution
is brought by affirmative conclusions, which come close to the end of the
question, as they are followed only by short answers to the principal argu-
ments. Antonius Andreae states there that the first subject of natural phi-
losophy is substance the formal characteristics of which is naturality.s
Although Antonius Andreae confesses that the opinions he presents in
Dc tribus principiis naturae are inspired by Duns Scotus, he never men-
tions explicitly the immediate source he draws them from. It can be
shown, however, that the inspiration came from two sources: Scotus'
6. (Y. Antonius Andreac, Quac)tronce de tribus principiis rerun naturalium, Fcnctiis
1489, 1. I rb-6.
7. Ibidern, f. 1 vb-2ra.
8. Ibidern, f. 2rb-4ra.
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question on the subject-matter of theology from his .Sentcaccs conunen-
tary (Prologue, part III, question 3) provided both model and the set of
conditions Antonius readily makes use of and the questions from the sixth
book of his Quaestiones subtilissimae in libros Metaphysicae gave Anto-
nius some clues concerning the actual content of the first subject of natural
philosophy and its formal characteristics and the characteristics of mobi-
lity. Both sources are extensively though somewhat latently cited by An-
tonius throughout his work."
Having established natural substance as the subject-matter of natural
philosophy Antonius goes on to discuss its constitutive principles. The
first part of De tribus principiis is devoted to matter and the five questions
it comprises deal with several problems characteristic for physical conside-
rations of the time: whether matter has a positive being independently
from form, whether it can exist without a form, whether it can be genera-
ted and corrupted, whether matter subject to quantity has extension diffe-
rent from the extension of quantity and whether matter is something that
is essentially contained in the concept of quiddity. It can be seen that An-
tonius' scope of interest here is formed alongside the issues which in the
13th and 14th century were subjects of debate between the Aristotelian
standpoint of Thomas Aquinas and his followers, the more traditional
point of view, characteristic for the Franciscan school and the opinions of
Duns Scotus, who tried finding the ,middle road,, between the two. It
could also be said that mans' of those questions might rather be classified
as metaphysical, not physical; still their subject-matter is material, hence
natural, substance and this alone seems to be enough for Antonius to treat
them as pertaining to philosophy of nature.
Pondering over the ontological status of matter Antonius Andreae sta-
tes that contrary to many philosophers who denied it any positive being
and maintained that its being was merely privative, i.e. that it was a pure
potency, matter has a positive being. Antonius argues that it is clearly visi-
ble, since matter is one of the constitutive parts of the composite, whereas
something which would only be a privation could not be a part of anyt-
hing. It follows, therefore, that both form and matter are positive princi-
ples, really different from one another, like two different ,things-. As
such, each of them is intelligible independently of the other not only by
God but also by men. The latter, however, cannot have the intellection of
matter or form separately in statu isto, i.e. in mortal life, since what is the
object of human intellect in this life is not being as such but quiddity of
material things.'
Accepting matter as a positive, independent reality leads Antonius An-
dreae to a conclusion that it possesses its own entitative act, prior to the
act given to it by form. Naturally, this act does not eliminate the potential
character of matter with respect to the form; still it distinguishes the po-
tency of matter from the potency of an accident. The former is the so-ca-
lled ,subjective potency,,, i.e. it is a substrate for any form which may co-
9. Cf. M. Gensler, Two quaestiones concerning the subject - matter of physics, a paper pre-
sented at the conference - Aristotle in Britain in the Middle Ages><, Cambridge 1994, p. 208-
209.
10. Cf. Antonius Andreae, Op. cit., f. 6ra - b, 7ra.
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me to it and it remains the same ,thing- both in the beginning and in the
end of the processes of generation and corruption; by contrast, the latter
potency is pure absence of certain quality which comes with the form.
Thus the proper act of matter is that which constitutes it as a being in
<<Subjective potency»."
Positive being and its own act already constitute matter as something.
Such a point of view is not extraordinary in the times of Antonius An-
dreae, for we can find it not only in Scotus, who is the most immediate
source of the theses presented in De tribus princzpiis naturac, but also in
Henry of Ghent.'' However, what for Henry was a theological issue
which could hardly be solved by philosophical means, for Antonius is a
legitimate physical problem, the solution of which had already been given
by the Subtle Doctor. He claims: "Est conclusio Scots, quod materia sine
aliqua contradictions potest per se existere sine quacumque forma subs-
tantiali sive accidentals, vel absoluta vel respectiva»." In the polemics
Antonius discusses an interesting objection raising the problem that mat-
ter existing without any form would be unlimited and thus form an infini-
te body - something impossible and contradictory according to Aristote-
lian physics. Antonius replies that matter is unlimited only in a positive
way, i.e. it has no external limits of itself which could give it a definite sha-
pe, still it is limited in a negative way, i.e. it is not infinite in its internal di-
vision. Therefore, God can create a body without any form but not an in-
finite body.
Antonius notes that the discussions concerning material beings imply
the problem of bodiness and, consequently, extension. According to him,
matter has no extension of itself, when it is considered without the later
determinations given to the composite by categories. However, even when
matter is subject to the category of quantity, its extension is different from
the extension of quantity, because matter receives its extension the mo-
ment it is united with form to constitute a body, which is to say: before
any accidental determination (including the accident of quantity). Anto-
nius concludes that such extension of matter must be its characteristic fea-
ture, not different from it really. It must also be potential and it becomes
actualised only by extension superadded to it by the accidental form of
quantity."
Antonius Andreae's analyses pertaining to matter in the processes of
generation and corruption are a good example showing how he was refi-
ning the issues first dealt with by Duns Scotus. He observes that in the
process of corruption - and by a mirror analogy in generation, too - there
is a resolution of forms down to the prime matter. This process is different
in different beings, for in the ones, which have one form only, it occurs
instantaneously but in the ones, which have more forms, which is to say:
in all living material beings, it has certain duration, since even after the
destruction of the ultimate form there remains the form of bodiness. The
11. Cf. Ibidem, I. 66.
12. Cf. Henricus Gandavensis, Quaestiones Quodlibetales, v. 5 (ed. R. Macken), Leuven -
Leiden 1979, Quodlibet 1, q. 1C, p. 65-67.
13. Antonius Andreae, Op. cit., f. Svb.
14. Cf. Ibidem, I. lOva- 1lvb.
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form of bodincss is an incomplete one (it has no species of its own) and it
is in continuous flux towards the prime matter, in which the other forms
subordinate to it are eliminated. This description, accounting for the pro-
cess of decay provides a detailed explanation for doubts concerning the
Scotist doctrine of plurality of forms at the same time giving a good solu-
tion to the difficulties raised by the competing doctrine of unity of the
substantial form upheld by Thomas Aquinas and his followers.''
The last of the questions concerning matter takes up the problem
analysed by natural philosophers since the times of Aristotle: if material
beings -- unlike the immaterial ones - are composed of form and matter
this must be somehow accounted for by their essences. Antonius' answer
is no different from the ones given by the communis opinio doctorum, sta-
ting that matter indeed pertains to the quiddity of material beings, but
what it interesting about it is the elegant network of distinctions he pre-
sents on the way. Ile says that in things composed of matter and form
both one and the other can be viewed in a number of ways. In the first pla-
ce, both form and matter can be treated as integral parts of a composite,
i.e. an individual substance, in the simplest, Aristotelian sense of the
words. Secondly, they can be analysed in reference to quiddity (essence).
Here, the form is referred to either as forma totius, the form of the whole,
whose appropriate matter can only be that which makes it individual, i.e.
haecceity (n.b. Antonius does not use this term in De tribus pr-incipus na-
ture preferring the circumlocutive proprietas individualis), or it is referred
to as forma partis or partial form, whose appropriate counterpart is natter
conceived of in an absolute way as the potential principle of being. Finally,
form as referring to essence can be treated as an abstract and then its mnate-
rial counterpart is simply an individual, since individuals are the matter of
species. In those distinctions we can see Antonius the textbook writer at
his best. He conveniently categorises the new concepts introduced by
Duns Scotus (in this case - haecceity) and puts them within the framework
of existing, well established terms in order to facilitate the understanding
of the problem. He is even not afraid of attaching the dubious label of
,,matter- to the principle of individuation, as long as he knows he is not
sailing away from the meaning given to it by the Subtle Doctor.''
The other of the two main parts of the work, which concerns form
(for, as it has been said, privation receives somewhat less attention) con-
tains five questions dealing with similarly important problems of the 14th
century natural philosophy: the existence of rationes seminales in matter,
the existence of measure for forms generated naturally, the problem whet-
her substantial forms are distinguished as mutually contradictory, whether
there is plurality of substantial forms in natural substances and whether
grade can be found in quidditics of accidental forms. In the question about
rationes seminales Antonius looks back to a problem well established in
the tradition of Augustinian philosophy. It was his teacher, Duns Scotus
who departed form that tradition, which until then had been shared by
most Franciscan masters, St. Bonaventure included. Antonius Andreae, re-
maining a faithful disciple upholds the position of his master, providing
15. Ct. lbidcrn, f. I Ora.
16. Cl. Ibidem, f. I2rb-13vb and 21 va-b.
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amply arguments for it. I IC shows that if one accepts the before presented
doctrine of matter as a positive principle of natural things, there is no need
to introduce anything that would have to play the role of active principle,
stimulating" matter to receive a form. Matter with its own act of hem, ill
subjective potency is of itself ready to accept forms and thus ratio semina-
lis is a concept suitable only in more particular considerations of the pro-
blem animal generation, impregnation and conception."
Of the remaining four questions concerning form three constitute a
distinct unity, centred around the problem grades of forms and their com-
parability. The subject has become exceedingly popular in the 14th cen-
tury and it can be treated as a sign of growing disappointment with Aris-
totelian qualitative physics and an anticipation of the new, quantitative
approach. Admittedly, Antonius Andreae is no revolutionary here but his
stress on the successive character of the processes of generation and co-
rruption, seen as assumption or removal of form, respectively, measured
against the flow of time, already possesses some resemblance to modern
presentation of the concept of change and motion.
Naturally, a closer look on Antonius conception show fundamental
differences between his Scotist perspective and that of the modern physics.
His doctrine remains strongly attached to Aristotelian concepts and pre-
sumptions. In generation, change is a gradual process but occurring bet-
ween opposing extremes. Moreover, it is gradual only with respect to crea-
tures consisting of more than one substantial form, thus allowing their
successive assumption; therefore beings informed by are single form must
be generated instantaneously (in accordance with the opinions of Aristotle
and Thomas Aquinas). Finally, as long as it refers to assumption of succes-
sive forms and their perfectional portions, it is not continuous.
The best example Antonius Andreae presents to illustrate the process
of substantial change as one occurring between opposing extremes is that
of the transmutation of elements. Because the forms of elements are in op-
position (though not contradictory), they are apt to undergo successive
changes from one to another by means of intension and remission of their
essential properties: calidity, frigidity, humidity and dryness. The neces-
sary condition for those changes is possessing one and the same matter,
which is the substrate in which those processes take place. This excludes
the possibility of gradual change in immaterial beings but does not rule it
out in material substances. Indeed, Antonius admits successive change in
substantial forms and accordingly he must accept that in the process of
substantial generation it is possible to notice certain grades, which makes
him finally concede that though something cannot be ,more" or <<less'>
substance it is still possible to distinguish between <<more>> or ,less noble"
grades of such form."
Antonius' solution of the problem is all the more interesting when we
note that lie ventures to give a clear and definite solution to the problem
Duns Scotus answered in a particularly obscure way, which made his edi-
tor and commentator Lucas Wadding observe: ,vix aut ne vix quidem capi
potest>>. A. Maier claims that close analysis of various comments of Duns
17. Cf. lbidcm, f. I5ra->a.
I8. Cf. Ibidem, f. I8ra-vvb.
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Scotus, contained mostly but not exclusively in his Quacstiones in llcta-
phvsicarn, on the problem of remission and intension in substantial and
elementary forms shows that the Subtle Doctor did not actually accept the
possibility that such forms can possess grades and remained within the fra-
mework of Aristotelian - Thomist way of thinking about it. She adds that
Antonius' position on the issue is clearly influenced by Averroism. Aver-
roistic influence or not, the concept of grade in substantial and elementary
forms is a clever solution, providing good explanation for problems of in-
dividuation, change and transmutation in a similar way it offered solution
to the problem of motion with respect to accidental forms. With his solu-
tion, but only there, Antonius seems to overcome the traditional separate
treatment of substances and accidents."
Plurality of substantial forms is the issue which is frequently mentio-
ned in earlier questions of De tribus principiis naturae but Antonius An-
dreae devotes to it a separate question in order to present and defend the
Scotist point of view against the Thomists, whose opinions he duly refu-
tes. The arguments Antonius adduces are all taken from natural philo-
sophy: he claims that since no accident can be present in matter without
the mediation of substantial form and one and the same accident remains
in the corpse and in the living creature, there must be a substantial form
which remains in the body even after the soul, which is the ultimate form,
has been separated from it. According to Antonius, who follows Scotus
closely here, this argument is valid not only with respect to human beings,
as suggested by Henry of Ghent, but to all animate creatures, which besi-
de the ultimate form possess substantial form of bodiness, which is the
form of mixtion (sc. of elements) appropriate for that kind of creature.
Furthermore, even parts of the body can have their separate substantial
forms of mixtion, since various parts differ in their composition and so it
would he impossible for them to be informed by one and the same form.
At the same time, Antonius is not afraid that such a plurality of forms
shows creatures as aggregates rather than composites - he claims that subs-
tantial forms form a hierarchical structure starting from the elementary
ones and ending in the ultimate specific forms, the final perfection and
unity being given by the individual grade.'
The sole question discussing the problem of the third principle of natu-
re - privation - could well belong to the first part of the treatise, since it se-
ems to be more concerned with matter than with privation itself, analysing
whether privation is identical with potency of matter. The principal ques-
tion Antonius Andreae raises there is what the potency of matter is like.
I le states that potency of matter is understood in a double way: either as a
fundament or as a relation (respectus), the latter being further divided into
respectus aptitudinalis and respectus actualis. Of these three types of po-
tency, the first is not different from matter, either really or formally, the
second - is not different really but is different formally, the third - is really
different from matter. The three types of potency refer to matter conside-
red in general, separable and inseparable matter, respectively. What lie me-
19. Cl. A. Maier, ,Die «moderne» Richtung', in: An der Grenze von Scholastik and
Naturwissenschaft, Roma 1952, p. 108-109.
20. Cf. Antonius Andreae, Op. cit., f. 19vb-21va.
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,ills by separable or inseparable matter is actually the separability of its po-
tency. Actual potency is separable from matter since it refers to an act,
which is external to it; aptitudinal potency is not separable from matter for
matter is always apt to receive a form and, therefore, such potency can he
separated from matter only formally but not really. The final solution is
expectedly concordant with the earlier view of matter as positive principle
and rejects the claim of identity of matter and privation on the ground that
matter is not altogether identical with potency.''
The final question of De tribus principiis naturae plays the role of an
epilogue in which the plots of the story are finally put together before it is
over. Antonius Andreae shows the principles of nature in a dynamic pers-
pective, asking whether composite of matter and form is the end of the
process of natural generation. He states that the principles of nature can be
divided in the following way: matter and form are the two principles of es-
sence of things, form and privation are the two principles of generation of
things. He points out that neither form nor matter exist per se but only per
accidens with respect to the composite; similarly, neither form nor priva-
tion are generated per Sc - only the composite. It is because of that - he
says - that generation is called natural, as it leads to the coming to being of
a natural being. The composite of those principles, emerging from the pro-
cess of generation, is an act ending the process; at the same time it is an en-
tity really different from the entities of its constitutive parts (as they can
continue to exist even after its destruction). The entity of a composite has
absolute character, i.e. it exists of itself with no respect to anything else. It
is the form of the whole (forma totius) which is identical with quiddity of
a thing. It is, therefore, not an individual, for individuality is something
which is external to the concept of quiddity and comes to it only as a final
act of the form .22
As it call be seen from the brief presentation of the main problems
analysed by Antonius Andreae in De tribus principiis naturae the work is
an interesting piece of writing. In a compact form it addresses many, if not
all, the most important debates in natural philosophy of the time, presen-
ting at the same time consistently (or almost consistently) Scotist solu-
tions. It is small wonder then that it was soon used as a source or a refe-
rence book for many scholars interested in Scotist philosophy of nature,
even though - as it has been said - most of the opinions presented there
can be found directly in the texts of the Subtle Doctor, yet in a much less
orderly arrangement, to say the least.
A good example of the early reception of Antonius Andreae's Dc tri-
bus principiis naturae is the Quaestiones in libros Physicorum by Theodo-
ricus of Magdeburg, a little known Bolognese Averroist, who later taught
in the newly opened university of Erfurt. The Quaestiones might have be-
en written still in Antonius' lifetime for they are dated before 1347. In se-
veral place in their text one can find a handful of remarks concerning
Scotist solutions, some of them naming the author of the quoted opinion;
in two cases it is the name Antonius, which can be clearly identified to
stand for Antonius Andreae. By comparison, the name of Scotus appears
21. Cf. Ibidem, f. 22va-23rh.
22. Cf. Ibidern, f. 25va-26va.
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two or three times. zAntonius is cited in tlhe first question: «Utruin ens mo-
bile sit hic subicetum'> and in the 18th one: ,Utruin potentia materiae dis-
tinguatur ab eius esscntia,>; in the former Antonius views arc reported in
rationes principales alongside arguments taken from other philosophers,
namely Thomas Aquinas and Giles of Rome, in the latter - Antonius is the
only authority quoted in the question (beside Aristotle and Avcrroes, of
course), not in the rationes principales but in the conclusiones, which fo-
llow them.
Both instances of citation share the same characteristic feature: Theo-
doricus looks to Antonius not because he does not know Scotus, for he
quotes him elsewhere in his work, but because it is only in Antonius that
the can find definitive and ready answers to the very problems he discusses
in his questions. Neither the problem of the subject-matter of physics nor
that of the relation between matter and its potency is directly addressed in
Scotus; Antonius, on the contrary, devotes a whole question to each. In
neither of the questions does Theodoricus accept Antonius position, in
neither, however, are they outright rejected, either.2 1
work which treats De tribus principiis naturae as an unquestiona-
ble source is another commentary on the Physics, which used to be attri-
buted to Antonius Andreae himself. The work, which has been preserved
in one manuscript copy only (in the library of Gonville & Caius College
in Cambridge), conics most probably from the turning of 14th and 15 cen-
turies and beyond any doubt is a product of Scotist school, possibly the
Franciscan Studium Generale in Cambridge. The commentary is an inte-
resting work, since it incorporates large fragments of the text of Dc tribus
principiis into a broader and more comprehensive study of Aristotle's
Physics. However, the author does not make any mention of the fact that
some sections, or indeed whole questions sometimes, are taken from the
work by Antonius Andreae; on the contrary, they are treated as integral
parts of the work. The -striking similarity>> to De tribus principiis nature
resulting from it was probably the reason why the Physics commentary
was ascribed to Antonius.
It does not seem to be a coincidence that the question which makes
probably the most liberal use of the material from De tribus principiis na-
turae is the initial question, devoted to the subject matter of natural philo-
sophy. Although the author formulates the title of the question a little dif-
ferent from Antonius and, accordingly, rearranges the material in a little
different way, supplementing it with a handful of theses of other Francis-
can masters: Duns Scotus, Francis of Marchia and Peter Auriol, the core of
the question repeats almost literally the arguments and conclusions pre-
sented by Antonius Andreae. Again, it can be seen that Antonius becomes
an authority, for fellow Scotists at least, in those issues in which he is crea-
tively developing the ideas of Scotus, -filling in,, those spaces, which the
Subtle Doctor would not or could not address himself.'h
23. Cf. M. Gensler, <A Peep or a Gaze? References to Antonius Andreae in "Quaestiones
super Physicann> by Theodoricus of Magdeburg-, in: Atti del Congresso Scotistico
Internazionalc , Roma 1993, Roma 1995, p. 1066-1071.
24. Cf. M.Gensler, Two quaestiones concerning the subject-matter of physics, paper pre-
sented at the S.I.E.P.M. Conference: Aristotle in Britain in the Middle Ages, Cambridge 1994,
p. 195-209.
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Such an approach of Antonius and to Antonius paved the way for his
Dc tribus principiis naturac to the libraries and curricula of Franciscan
Studio Generalia around Europe. The two examples presented before sug-
gest good knowledge of De tribus principiis in Italy and in England alre-
adv in the 14th ccnturv. The interest in the work does not fade throughout
the next century: an early 15th century manuscript of De tribus principiis
preserved in the Bibliotheca Amploniana in Erfurt (a name already invo-
ked here, too) contains information that the work was copied in Cambrid-
ge by a German Franciscan, Hclmhold von Arendorp, who later taught in
Erfurt.'' Erfurt, in turn, was a university with close relations to Prague.
This might explain how the copies of Dc tribus principiis appeared there.
The interest in the work in Prague must have been considerable, for it is
the only place beside Rome where it has survived in more than one copy.
Actually, of the 16 copies known to exist nowadays, four are in Rome and
three in Prague. (,
Poland, too, recognised the value of Antonius Andreae's treatise as a
reliable manual of Scotist philosophy of nature, even though the influence
of Scotism in Poland was limited, mostly because it appeared there very la-
te - only in the end of the 15th century. It is interesting that the first re-
marks concerning De tribus principiis nature in the works of masters of
the Krakow university appear in the polemical arguments of the oppo-
nents of Scotism: Johannes de Glogovia and Jacobus de Gostynin, both
authors of commentaries on the Physics. However, polemics with Anto-
nius Andreae can be found in the works of Polish Scotists, too: Nicolas
Twarog of Biestrzykow and Johannes of Stobnica criticise Antonius for
the solution he gives to the problem of ...the subject-matter of natural phi-
losophv.- In the end, therefore, it can be said that the success of De tribus
principiis naturac by Antonius Andreae was not merely a reflection of the
success of Scotism. It was, and in some way still is, the success of a bri-
lliant piece of philosophical writing, rightly earning for its author the title
of Doctor dulcifluus - the Sweet-spoken Doctor.
25. (It. W. Schum, Veizeichnis der Amplonianischen Ilandsc{rrijtllchc-Samnilungen zu
Er/inut, Berlin 1887, nr F 359.
26. Cf. M. Gensler, Catalogue.... p. 150.
27. Cf. M. Markowski, Filozo(ia przprody zz drugicj po3oz^ic XV uieku (Dzicjc bilozofu
(rrcdniowieczncj L Polscc, t, X), Wroclaw 1983, p. 49-50.
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